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FAILURES OF THE ROMANIAN INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
Sorin Ioniţă 
 
When we evaluate the impact of the international donors on the institutional 
reforms it is useful to distinguish two main categories of assistance programs, 
according to their functional purpose: 
• Institution building, mainly in the public sector, with the aim of setting up new 
public agencies or reform the existing ones, provide training or equipment, 
implement new procedures, transfer best-practices, and so on. The target group 
here is the public sector or portions of it, and the ultimate goal is to improve its 
effectiveness, transparency and user-friendliness. For the purpose of this article 
let us call this assistance, type A. 
• Capacity building in the private sector, which aims to increase awareness 
among the public and stimulate participation, whether we are speaking of non-
profit forms of association or even profit-oriented activities. The fundamental 
idea here is that no matter how sound the institutions become through efforts of 
type A, there will always be communities who do not have the capacity, 
experience or resources to participate in democratic governance or take 
advantage of the economic opportunities when they arise. Institutional reforms 
of type A are, so to speak, similar to pushing a string: in order to get the 
desired effect, there should be someone pulling at the other end. When there 
isn’t, some intervention is necessary to show people how to do it or to 
capacitate them, which takes the form of grass-root activity, facilitation or 
micro-financing. In theory this works well and there is no doubt that some 
intervention of this kind is necessary in Romania, but by its very nature this 
complex of activities – type B – is much more difficult to design and 
implement than the domestic planners and well-meant donors let us believe.  
Some preliminary observations should be made here. First, the types A and B are 
analytical categories rather than accurate descriptions that fit the reality perfectly. 
There are always border cases, as well as certain actors who can be targeted with 
both kinds of intervention – for example the local governments, part of the 
institutional reform as far as the budgetary process is concerned, but also part of 
the capacity building effort at the grass-root level in impoverished areas. 
Investments in infrastructure, like the ones financed by EU or World Bank, are 
complex projects which cut across categories: they improve the managerial 
capacity of domestic institutions by speeding up the transfer of skills to national 
institutions; but also represent a direct investment in communities who otherwise 
cannot finance the necessary improvements. 
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Second, the distinction between A and B has important practical consequences, 
because the design, implementation and evaluation of the two kinds of assistance 
are very different in terms of means, expertise involved and the participation of 
beneficiaries. When things are mixed up, undesired effects may occur – for 
example, an overemphasis on broad participation in, and ‘local ownership’ of, 
programs can easily block reforms of type A, especially in societies where 
corruption and clientelism constitute the rule rather than the exception. Listening 
to the beneficiaries, an increasingly popular idea in the international donor 
organizations, may be a good thing, but the process of listening should have 
structure, timeframe and very clear purposes, otherwise nothing more than endless 
complaints and long laundry lists will come out of a typical open-ended 
consultation (with the item ‘more money’ always towards the top). Making public 
choices in an organized and meaningful way is not something that occurs naturally 
in communities, organizations or professional bodies, but the result of a long and 
deliberate process of structured learning. Sometimes the confusion is increased 
deliberately by those who will try to turn programs of type A into B, with their 
own home-base as a prime beneficiary. There will always be domestic groups who 
will use the rhetoric of democratic consultation – no matter if broad participation 
makes sense or not in a particular program, and if it does, who should participate 
and in what forms – in order to appropriate resources or to block undesired 
changes. One such group, and very powerful, is the central bureaucracy. 
Third, in the CEE countries the first priority of the foreign donors should be the 
assistance of type A. In the post-communist world, in spite of the current 
difficulties, most people do have the knowledge and material resources necessary 
to act in their own advantage once the right institutions are in place. When this 
does not happen, the main culprit is usually a wrong institutional framework or 
system of incentives. A certain passivism the in post-Communist societies is real, 
but much too often it is blamed on psychology, deep cultural cleavages along sexy 
Huntingtonian borders, or material deprivation, when in fact it is only the rules of 
the game which are skewed. When these are fixed, we usually see rational 
behavior and self-reliance emerging with remarkable speed. 
Which is not to deny that there are pockets of poverty and destitution where an 
intervention of type B is required: certain isolated rural areas, small towns with 
ailing mono-industries, the Roma community, etc. But the intervention will not be 
sustainable and the unintended consequences will predominate as long as the 
problems of type A are not fixed in the first place. Briefly stated, the point here is 
that, given the relative magnitude of problems in these societies, for the same 
amount of resources committed by a foreign donor the quickest and biggest social 
impact by far is achieved with intervention of type A. 
All these said, let us see how the international assistance effort worked in 
Romania in the last years. Our brief analysis will focus on three main donors who 
initiated and financed development programs with institutional reform components 
in the region: EU, World Bank and the US bilateral assistance through USAID.  
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The European Union 
EU is the most important donor and its contribution is likely to increase in the 
future as Romania presumably makes further steps in the accession process. 
Unfortunately, it is also the most inefficient as far as the institutional reform is 
concerned. Brussels has not been able to use its leverage in order to speed up 
changes that everybody knew were necessary. Most of the time, the impression is 
that some measures are pressed on the Romanian government just in order to check 
boxes on a list; after some sketchy elements are implemented, the EU is happy to 
put up with any kind of nonsense coming from Bucharest. The whole story of 
ANDR-ADR mentioned above is one such example: even though substantial 
resources were invested in the creation of this institutional structure, there was no 
word from the EU when it was excluded from the Euro-sponsored development 
projects it was supposed to manage. The Law of the Civil Service was a condition 
for taking Romania in at the Helsinki summit in 1999; the fact that is openly 
broken today brings no reaction from Brussels, even though the Union invested 
money in training people who are now purged. Most of the time the EU Delegation 
in Bucharest tends to be extremely accommodating, to put it mildly, to the wishes 
of the Romanian cabinet in office. When the envoy of the European Parliament, 
Baroness Emma Nicholson, warned against politicizing of administration during 
its February 2001 visit, her statements found an echo only with the press. 
Unlike USAID and, to some extent, the World Bank, EU has no staff in the 
field who could help with the design and administration of the programs it 
finances. This is a crucial point, since in the CEE countries there is a shortage of 
managing capabilities very often underestimated by the Western donors and 
analysts. Even when local people are well intended (which is not always the case) 
the rate of absorption of funds is small because the capacity to generate sound 
projects is very limited. Moreover, the EU is geared towards big programs which, 
once started, must move a lot of money within a specified deadline. There is little 
flexibility, room for feed-back and the assessment tend to be made in terms of 
inputs rather than outcomes. Hence the obvious preference for projects of 
infrastructure, or big programs that make available to the existing Romanian public 
institutions substantial resources to play with, rather than use this resources in 
order to reform the institutions and make them more efficient – a tendency that 
suits well the Romanian authorities and aggravates the problem of clientelism. 
Therefore, even though the programs look fine because they were completed more 
or less in time and the administrative costs are small, the impact in terms of 
reforms is nil (or worse).  
For example, little can be shown in the way of results for all the educational 
programs financed by EU in Romania in the last decade – Socrates, Erasmus, etc. 
Hundreds of students and teaching staff were toured around Europe, all in non-
degree programs too short to make a difference to someone’s professional 
development. The main beneficiaries of this form of academic tourism were 
probably the second-rate Western European universities who were paid for hosting 
East-Europeans. With less money, the World Bank program of financing 
alternative textbooks or the Soros Foundation’s strategy of financing advanced 
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degrees in Western-type universities are likely to have a much more substantial 
and long-lasting impact on these societies. 
Since EU has little professional staff in the field to monitor projects, no strategy 
for the transfer of managerial skills and no reliable system of measuring outcomes, 
both the A and B components of its aid tend to take the form of distributing 
handouts. These are easy to evaluate in terms of inputs, easy to administer in a 
centralized way and the spending capacity of the beneficiaries, once a program is 
approved, is never a problem. To be sure, there are rules and procedures to be 
followed and everything is subject to verification by the EU Court of Accounts. 
But most of the time the procedures refer to the strict following of budgetary lines 
or compliance with the intricate EU regulations – like rules of origin for equipment 
and supplies used in the projects1. So that the institutional building effort (A) 
usually ends up in shopping sprees by public institutions (office technology most 
often) or short trainings abroad for those employees with the right connections to 
make it into the exchange team. The programs of type B are equally 
uncoordinated. Big designs and goals do not translate automatically into workable 
institutions able to keep the activity focused on achievable objectives. There is a 
real danger that the growing EU assistance, if not restructured, will create a culture 
of dependency in the public sector and parts of the private one similar to the cargo 
cult among the people of the Pacific islands. We have the bad experience of 
Southern Italy or Greece to witness that this kind of development is not a far-off 
perspective.  
 
World Bank 
The World Bank is generally more successful in enforcing its conditionality on the 
Romanian government. The results are mixed, but there is a strong sense that the 
overall vision that underlies the WB operations in Romania is correct and that big 
lending programs like PSAL (industrial restructuring and privatization) and ASAL 
(reforms in agriculture) have played a role in pushing the reform ahead. Technical 
assistance in areas like improving the business environment, strengthening the 
financial sector or restructuring the land market in rural areas is badly needed. WB 
also helped with the setting up and financing the most successful B-type project in 
Romania by now – the Romanian Social Development Fund. RSDF is a permanent 
body which recruits and train facilitators, and send them to work for longer periods 
in the poorest and most isolated rural communities. The facilitators encourage poor 
people to associate and initiate small productive activities or make partnerships 
with the local government in order to improve the local infrastructure, help them 
write applications for funds and develop basic management skills, and help them 
run the projects once a small grant is offered by RSDF or other donors. The 
chances are high that when the assistance ends in one village such projects will be 
                                                    
1 These should be made in EU or a candidate country, even when there are similar 
products available manufactured in non-EU states which cost less; compliance with the 
rules of origin is not always simple, since in the new globalized economy there may be 
different locations where a product is made, assembled, sold or the brand registered.  
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sustainable, and it is the merit of RSDF that it forged the appropriate 
organizational culture which makes this kind of intervention, much more pro-
active and difficult to implement, successful, in spite of the limited funding 
available.  
There are two threats facing the WB development programs, however. First, the 
same pressures mentioned above are present to transform the institution-building 
assistance into distribution of handouts. In 2000, the Bank came out with the idea 
of initiating a Rural Development Program (RDP) in Romania, with a size similar 
to a yearly installment of the EU Sapard program. As the government were 
dragging their feet over Sapard because of the turf wars between central agencies, 
and the EU aid was slow to come anyway, the idea was that the Bank’s program 
would offer the opportunity to move forward, put the institutional framework for 
running Sapard in place and test it. However, this original idea had to be 
abandoned due to the strong resistance of the Romanian authorities and the 
unpreparadness of the WB to press the issue too far. Instead, the RDP was turned 
into a annex component of Sapard with no strings attached and phased over the 
same period of seven years. What could have been an institution-building program 
is thus likely to end up as a supplement to a typical EU disbursement of money 
through the complicated and corrupt domestic channels patronized by the Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
The second threat is of a more general nature, but it explains very well why such 
things happen with programs like RDP. The new overall strategy of the World 
Bank to promote inclusiveness, participation of beneficiaries other than the 
national governments, listen to the voices of the local communities and learn from 
them, can easily become a cliché void of any content. The people, both at the 
giving and receiving end of a program, learn very quickly that the keys of success 
in the new approach are not the sound organizational structure, clear objectives and 
measurable performance, but the right kind of rhetoric full of buzz-words like 
broad participation, empowerment, attention for the real needs of the people as 
opposed to those identified by bureaucrats, etc. What is important is to show that 
you care, not the actual impact you make in reality. In other words, we are 
witnessing a process of LadyDi-enization of the international assistance. The 
rhetoric of participation also contributes to the above-mentioned obscuring of 
differences between A- and B-programs. Very often the fact is overlooked that 
successful B-programs require not only careful planning, but also very flexible and 
professional implementation mechanisms and presuppose high administrative costs 
– when the purpose of the program is to stimulate profit-oriented activities and run 
micro-lending schemes, what we do practically is investment banking.  
This rhetoric is all the more dangerous since it has strong natural constituencies:  
• Various local groups who want to take part, whether they have a business or 
not, in order to gain prestige or access to resources. 
• All the stakeholders involved, in order to shape as much as possible the 
intervention according to their needs. This is especially important in A-
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programs: sometimes they will attempt to block any change, sometimes they 
will try to shift the focus towards a distribution of handouts. 
• Local experts working as consultants, who have learnt that it is possible to 
make a decent living by running over and over again ‘need-assessments’ and 
provide at high cost the same predictable and mostly useless piece of advice: 
this and that community are poor and must be helped, making people cooperate 
is a good thing indeed, and that the list of needs is the following… (always 
more or less the same).  
• The Romanian authorities, who have noticed very early on that, due to the high 
transaction costs and the lack of structuring, such broad consultations lead 
nowhere2. When everybody becomes exhausted with the exercise and the 
deadline draws closer, they know that the conditionality will be relaxed and the 
donors will become more yielding. Therefore the Romanian politicians and top 
bureaucrats have developed good role-playing skills, knowing that they 
attrition strategy will help them prevail in the long run. 
• Finally, the staff of the donor organization itself. Instead of working hard on 
designing programs, documenting best-practices, finding the right experts and 
monitoring the implementation of programs, the rhetoric of empowerment and 
giving the beneficiaries a voice offers an easy escape: earmark some money, 
convene eclectic meetings in the recipient country and send there some staff 
with good intentions and a listening ear, but little else to offer in the way of 
expertise, in order to stir up things. And cross your fingers in hope that some 
meaningful plan will come out of that. 
 
US bilateral assistance 
Whether it is implemented through the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) or not, this kind of assistance differs from those discussed above because 
is more tightly controlled by a foreign government, has clearer procedures and is 
much less accommodating to the wishes of the Romanian bureaucracy. The total 
amount of aid is much smaller than the one provided by EU or WB, so it is all the 
more surprising that the results are sometimes spectacular, especially in A-type 
programs, and can serve as a model to be followed by others donors. Only three 
examples.  
The transfer of know-how in the area of tax reform: a team of American experts 
from the US Department of Treasury was brought to Bucharest and they worked in 
                                                    
2 A good example is the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) initiative, a two-
year futile effort to bring together all the domestic stakeholders and sources of expertise 
on development and devise a strategy / document / action plan. It failed because it relied 
too much on the goodwill and skills of the domestic actors, public and private. Had they 
had the ability and determination to make such a loose structure work, they wouldn’t 
probably have needed the WB assistance in the first place – indeed, they could have 
become international providers, and not receivers, of institution-building assistance.  
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the Ministry of Finance for more than two years on drafting the Personal Income 
Tax Law and its implementation system. The law was adopted and it will become 
effective beginning with the fiscal year 2000. It is a good and clear statute, its 
impact will be substantial and long-lasting and the whole assistance effort was 
focused on a very narrow and urgent aspect of institutional reform where domestic 
expertise was scarce and the need was easy to identify without investing too much 
time and resources in the assessment process. ‘Ownership’ or the participation of 
beneficiaries did not raise special problems, since everybody understood what the 
whole thing was about. Moreover, an important component of the program 
consisted in training for the tax administration structures so that they will be able 
to carry on their duties under the new law. 
In the area of local government reform, USAID has financed a program run by 
IRIS, an American think tank, which is meant to encourage the local 
administration to cut red tape and establish one-stop offices for dealing with the 
citizens and businesses. A series of workshops was conducted in some big 
Romanian cities, materials and case-studies were provided to the mayors and a 
system of ‘Five Star Cities’ awards was set up to reward the best performers. The 
strong backing of the American ambassador, who handed out the awards, secured 
media coverage and visibility. Thus a small and cheap program made an impact 
much above its financial weight and, though its continuation is by no means 
guaranteed, it contributed to an increased public awareness of certain best-
practices and to the triggering of a positive demonstration effect. It is unlikely that 
such a program could have been initiated in the first place if somebody would have 
just gone around and run surveys asking people what are their ‘most urgent needs’. 
Another set of programs of institutional capacity building financed by USAID 
were run by the Urban Institute (also an American think tank) and some domestic 
private partners. UI consultants spent a substantial amount of time in Romania 
doing institutional audits in local government structures. The main focus was the 
budgetary process, which had just been considerably decentralized by a law passed 
in 1998. They produced the best institutional assessments of the budgetary 
practices in local government available so far, designed a strategy for improving 
the procedures based on the previous CEE experiences and developed good 
training materials. They provided valuable inputs to the newly reshuffled Ministry 
of Public Function – the Local Governments component (see the discussion 
above).  
 
Conclusion: best practices for assisting the institutional reform 
Based on the assessment of the Romanian institutional structure provided in the 
first parts of this material, and the experience of the three donor organizations 
presented above, a sketchy guideline for assisting the institutional reform in 
Romania can be put forward. 
• There should be a clear focus on the most urgent part of the reform process, 
which is institution-building. Therefore, most of the effort should go into A-
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type programs. The first priority is to encourage the stabilization of Romanian 
central coordination agencies, and assist their professionalization through a 
well-balanced mixture of aid and conditionality. The point is not, of course, for 
the aid donors to take over the act of governing, which is neither possible nor 
desirable, but to provide know how based on international best practices, and 
encourage the beneficiaries rethink the structures themselves and make them 
more rational and effective. At least some components of the assistance effort 
should involve both the current top public officials and the opposition (the 
shadow bureaucracy who will replace the former after elections, if we are to be 
realistic).  
• The goals of assistance need to be more narrowly defined, expressed in plain 
language and the progress towards them measured.  
• It is a good idea to contract out assistance activities to private organizations 
once an agreement is reached with the Romanian representatives. They posses 
the human resources and experience necessary to design and carry out sound 
programs. These are usually Western organizations with lean and transparent 
management structures and strong credentials in the field of public policy. The 
involvement of local experts should be much more carefully assessed in 
countries where professional reputations and social recognition are still poorly 
correlated with the actual level of expertise, to a degree hardly imaginable in 
Western societies. 
• The Romanian actors, public or private, can be involved gradually as the 
project develops, so that they have the time to learn the technical and 
managerial skills by seeing and doing. The foreign contractors are thus in a 
much better position to see which domestic partners are reliable in the long 
run, and pass this information on to the main donor. Also, the situation is 
avoided when around programs administered directly by a big donor or put to 
open tender from their inception a whole network of domestic clients emerge 
with no capability to carry out the project but with a strong determination to 
monopolize the access to resources. This is an important point to remember, 
since there is a marked tendency for some domestic groups to colonize formal 
institutions and programs and divert them from their original purpose.  
• Do not rely on the cooperation of local bureaucracies, who are heterogeneous, 
unstable and have a very distorted hierarchy of motives. Most of the time they 
should be regarded as subjects, rather than instruments, of reforms, although 
assistance should remain fundamentally cooperative in nature. 
• General purpose trainings meant to improve qualifications in the public sector 
do not always help. Actually, they rarely help. Even when they are well 
designed, the impact is insignificant on public officials who had not developed 
basic skills during their years of formal education. Participation in such events 
can bring them prestige, or small material gains when the seminar is held 
abroad, so they are always eager to come and behave co-operatively if they can 
pass the selection hurdle in their institutions (the selection process, too, usually 
reinforces clientelism and factionalization). On the other hand, executive 
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training for the few top officials who are really able to benefit from it is an 
exercise of shooting at a moving target – as it was said before, they are likely 
to leave after short spells in office. Therefore the best thing to do is to include 
training as a component in institutional reform programs with clear goals and 
deadlines, aimed at improving specific procedures rather than the general 
professional capacity of various individuals. The latter can only be achieved in 
the long run, by reforming the education system, which should of course be a 
legitimate target of international assistance itself. 
• The effort should aim at raising incrementally the performance of existing 
institutions, rather than encourage the creation of new structures, and thus 
aggravate the fragmentation and fluidity that was identified before as source of 
problems. The best way to do this is by implementing changes that increase 
democratic accountability through transparency and simplification, make the 
functioning procedures as fool-proof as possible, and so limit the damage done 
when a new administration reshuffles the civil service. 
 
In the end, a word of caution. The examples discussed above do not suggest that 
the EU assistance in Romania has been a total failure, and the American aid an 
unqualified success. The reality, of course, is more nuanced, with good and bad 
things to be said about each donor, and a final picture in shades of gray rather than 
clear-cut black and white areas. The differences in purpose and size of assistance, 
which are considerable  when we discuss about EU and USAID, for example, 
suggest that these comparisons should be taken with a pinch of salt. Moreover, 
there are other sources of assistance, most of them bilateral, which were not 
mentioned – for example, the British Know-How Fund, who made a substantial 
contribution, among other things, to the re-establishment of the stock-exchange in 
early ‘90s. The aim of this brief overview was only to offer a framework for 
understanding the contribution the international assistance can make to the 
institutional reform in Romania, identify some patterns of action and typologies, 
and draw some conclusions about the means to increase its effectiveness. 
 
 
